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THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ARBITER IN THE
ROMAN SENSE AND MODERN ARBITRATORS.
We find the word "arbitrium'" first definitely employed as
denoting the power of the ordinary judge (judex) to order the
defendant to make specific restitution or performance. All de-
crees under the "formulary" system, dating from (c.) 187
A. D., being pecuniary, the only way of getting specific relief
was to condemn the defendant in a penal or other sworn "nisi
restituat." This power may 'perhaps have been termed "arbi-
trium" because it lay in the discretion of the praetor when draw-
ing up the formula for the guidance of the judge, to insert in
it this clause directing him to make an order ("Jussus") for
specific performance if he found the defendant liable on the
facts.'
Next, we find the term arbitrium used in a somewhat simi-
lar sense in altogether a different class of cases. You will notice
that in the case dealt with above, the formula is not quite absolute
or positive. The praetor does not order the judge to condemn
the defendant to pay, without qualification, if he finds him liable.
He is only to pay "nisi restituat." Here we have clearly an
absolute, positive, clear legal obligation: A has B's property.
The judge, if he finds that to be the case, must give effect to
B's legal right, only he must do it in this way, if the praetor in
his discretion (arbitrium) inserts the "nisi restituat" clause:
i. e., he must not condemn A out of hand,-but only if he de-
clines to make specific satisfaction. In the case we are about
to consider, the writer's contention is that we are no -less in
presence of an absolute and conclusive legal right, though for the
reasons we shall now examine, the proceeding is nominally called
' Ortolan, "Instituts," t. III, Sec. 1937. The writer is aware that Justinian
(Inst. IV, 6, 31) says that the action in this case got its name of arbitraria
because it lay in the judge's "discretion" to allow the defendant the alternative
of restitution. But it did not: the judge was rigidly bound by the formula.
If the defendant restored, he must be absolved. It was reasonable that Jus-
tinian, legislating hundreds of years after the distinction between praetor and
judex had ceased to exist, should fail to appreciate the point. Moyle thinks
(Excursus X) that the name derives from the defendant's arbitrary "option"
to restore the goods or submit to damages.
(732)
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an arbitrium and the judge an arbiter. The direction to con-
demn is qualified in this case as well as in the last; it is really
not so greatly qualified, because, if the bench finds the facts
against the defendant, it must pronounce some condemnation;
there is no possibility of an absolution through defendant's com-
pliance with an alternative. The qualification is, that the bench
is not obliged to pronounce a hard .and fast condemnation for
i sum settled beforehand (or else to absolve); like a modern
jury, it can give what damages it thinks fit. This end is se-
cured by putting in the formula the words "ex fide bona." The
condemnatio is not "order A to pay £500 if you find him in
the wrong," but "order A to pay what is properly due from
him, if you find him in the wrong." Surely there is nothing in
the world here suggestive of anything but the decision of a due
legal claim. The formula "ex fide bona" was appropriate in
almost every case of unliquidated damages; it was used, and it
alone could be used, in all cases of claims arising out of bilateral
contracts-every case of dispute about sales, taxes, partnerships,
was tried in this way. Shall we say, therefore, that the Romans
had no law of sale-but that it was left to the absolute taste
and fancy of a casual arbiter to decide all cases. of sale by
the light of nature? Such a proposition would be ridiculous.
The arbiter decided according to law, and was bound so to de-
cide. Only he was not bound to give the plaintiff a certain
claimed sum, or nothing. He was at liberty, when he had ap-
plied the law to the facts, to say what the measure of damages
was; and he had other valuable, but secondary, powers of doing
justice between the parties, such as allowing set-off, dispensing
with formalities and the like. For this reason Cicero styles
the arbitrium "mite moderatum"; and so it is. The arbiter is
not bound to repel the plaintiff from his claim because he thinks
he has not put quite the right value on it. But no one has ever
suggested that he was entitled to substitute his own ideas and
fancies for the law, or to refuse the plaintiff his damages be-
cause he thought he had behaved badly.'
IOrt., op. cit., Sec. 1985.
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We find the two expressions "judex" and "'arbiter" em-
ployed even before the advent of the formulary system,- but
so indiscriminately, that Cicero says 3 that it seems to him a
remarkable thing that so many able men have so long applied
their intellects to the matter without its ever yet being possi-
ble to say decidedly whether one ought to say "judex" or "arbi-
ter" in any given case. If there were "'arbiters" there might
always be three of them (the Twelve Tables themselves say
so, speaking from the remotest antiquity), whilst a judex must
sit alone. Also, it is probable that an arbiter need not be a sena-
tor. And even the judex, as well as the arbiter, had to be agreed
on by the parties to the litigation. Probably, in the later de-
veloped of the legis actiones (which preceded the formulary
system)--i. e., in the judicis arbitrive postulatio, the bench was
more often than not composed of arbiters. But the grand dis-
tinction, whether under the regime of the legis actiones, or of
the formulary procedure which succeeded them, was that the
judex in the sacramentum or the conditio certi was bound by a
rigid direction to condemn in a certain amount, whilst the judex
or the arbiter in the postulatio and the arbiter in the formulary
system was only bound to condemn in a proper amount.
4
The distinction is put by Cicero in the De Officiis 5 perhaps
better than in any of his professional orations. It resides in
the fact that a judge or arbiter in a postulatio under the old pro-
cedure, and an arbiter under the formulary system, decided
salva fide. Not arbitrarily. Not according to their private
ideas. Not apart from legal considerations, but allowing weight
to considerations of good faith, as distinguished from techni-
calities. In a sacramentum or a condictio, bad faith was no
defense. Before arbiters, it was. Consequently they were en-
abled to award proper damages and were not limited to the dry
question of whether A had pronounced certain traditional words,
and gone through certain traditional actions, or not.
Pro Murena, XII.
'Ort., op. cit., Sec. 1870.
, III, I0.
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But all international law is based on good faith. Every
international court is a court of equity. We have reached the
stage in international affairs, when the formulary system was
replaced by the extraordinaire cognitio, and every action is an
actio bonae fidei. This must be so, as international law is em-
bodied in the conscience of the civilized world. The contention
that an arbitrator ought to go outside that law, and apply his
own ideas of morality would not be to imitate the arbiter and his
arbitrium, both of which kept strictly to the law; it would be to
sanction anarchy. If there were a code of obsolete and rigid
written international law, then and then only would it be right
to say that an arbitrator, in departing from it in favor of what
was universally thought stringently necessary, was a true suc-
cessor of the arbiters.
The strict old Roman law recognized only unilateral obli-
gations and property. Complex and reciprocal transactions, such
as the bilateral contract of sale, were beyond its grasp. A new
law arose to regulate them, and of this law the exponents were
the arbiters.' But it was as law that they expounded it, and
not as a system of arbitrary accommodations. Had the old
law not been exclusive and codified, and cramped by the forms
of former traditional "actions," the divergence between judge
and arbiter need never have arisen. The law was greater and
wider than "the Law." But in our times the law of nations
is one and indivisible. There is nothing to prevent arbitrators
from applying it, and no excuse for their applying something
different.
Dr. Hunter in his commentary on Roman law arrives at
the conclusion that the terms "judex" and ""arbiter," if not
synonymous "varied but slightly," and adds-"Whatever the
true explanation may be, we need not be surprised if the puzzle
that, according to Cicero, baffled the erudition and ingenuity of
the Republican jurisconsults, should be too much for us." By
the time of Gaius 7 the word judex was used for the judge in
'Cicero, De Oflciis, 47.
TA. D. 17o, circa.
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bonae fidei actions; so that by this time the distinction was quite
obliterated.8
What is clear, is the distinction between actions stricti juris
and actions bonae fidei, which distinction corresponds to noth-
ing in international law; and it is equally clear that a judex
could be appointed to try either, whilst an arbiter or arbiters
could only be appointed to try the last. It is clear also that
there was no difference in function that Cicero could detect.
May it not possibly be, that the original difference was in quali-
fication (the list of judges being a very select one), and that
when bonae fidei actions were developed, it lay in the arbitrium
of the praetor to refer the parties to such a litigation, at his
discretion, to a fidex or to a board of arbiters similar to the
recuperatores with whom he already was familiar as praetor
peregrinus?
It has been suggested that it is the praetor's arbitrium and
not the judge's, which gives a real action for the restitution of
property its name of an arbitrium; the praetor, in his arbitrary
discretion, inserts a nisi restituat clause. This would accord
with the idea that in the bonae fidei actions again, it is the
praetor's arbitrium, the exercise of which makes the arbiter;
the praetor decides again in his arbitrary discretion, to send the
case to skilled assessors instead of (like a stricti juris action) to
a judex.
It ought to be added that the action called a condictio in-
certi, although it was tried by a judge and according to all the
strictness of the older law, admitted of, and indeed required,
an estimation of damages by the judex. It is, as Ortolan re-
marks, a transitional stage in the progress from the condictio
certi where there was nothing for the tribunal to do but to find
the facts, and condemn or absolve accordingly, and the bonae
fidei action, in which it applied the new and developed law.
Thomas Baty, D.C.L., LL.D.
Inner Temple, London.
'Gaius IV., 63.
